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Shahrough Akhavi 
THE DIALECTIC IN CONTEMPORARY EGYPTIAN 
SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE SCRIPTURALIST AND 
MODERNIST DISCOURSES OF SAYYID QUTB 
AND HASAN HANAFI 
One of the most important arenas of the ferment in contemporary Arab social thought 
is Egypt. Egyptian writers have been contributing to a rapidly growing body of liter- 
ature on state and society. Its themes include methodological issues, the nature of the 
ideal Islamic society; the elite-mass gap; the state's role in public life; the appropriate 
model for socioeconomic development; and the social bases of Islamist movements. 
One dimension of contemporary Arab social thought has received less attention 
and merits further discussion. One is struck by the dialectic between the purposes of 
scripturalists and their utilization of modern concepts to promote traditionalist ob- 
jectives; similarly, modernists, influenced by ideas of foreign provenance, feel com- 
pelled to try to reach their goals by reference to early kalam.' Seemingly, those 
debating "whither Arab society" take either of two very general perspectives: one 
that proposes solutions to the current problems of state and society by means of an 
ahistorical emphasis on the timeless truths of received religious knowledge; or a 
second that adopts a more critical attitude toward tradition, while nonetheless uti- 
lizing some of its concepts and working these into historically grounded analysis. 
It is the capturing of this dialectic of scripturalist and modernist discourses that 
serves as the basic justification of this paper. Two contemporary writers seem to be 
prominent representatives, respectively, of scripturalist and modernist positions: 
Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) and Hasan Hanafi (b. 1935). Other Egyptian writers are im- 
portant in this context, but I will examine the thought of these two in particular. Qutb 
has been the subject of several studies, including but not limited to those of Ibra- 
him M. Abu-RabiC, Leonard Binder, Muhammad Hafiz Diyab, Yvonne Haddad, Gilles 
Kepel, Ahmad Moussali, CAdnan Musallam, and W. Shepard.2 The choice of Hanafi- 
less well known-seems apposite because he has explicitly presented his project as 
an antidote to the kind of scripturalism represented by Qutb, while harboring the 
same aspiration as the latter to make Islam meaningful once again in the lives of the 
Muslims. 
Qutb and Hanafi have both stressed Islam's role in contemporary politics. Both 
have urged action to bring about a better world. Hanafi explicitly and Qutb implicitly 
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address the turath-a word normally translated as "heritage" but which refers to the 
sum of contributions to the life of the Muslims by the sacred texts, along with com- 
mentaries and interpretations of these by theologians, jurists, and philosophers since 
the revelation.3 Yet Qutb and Hanafi differ in their approaches. The respected writer 
Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri places Qutb in the bayan tradition, meaning Qur'anic 
discourse that restricts itself to the use of sacred text and consensus for its message. 
He views Hanafi, by contrast, as belonging to the burhan tradition. Here, only per- 
ception, experimentation, and rationalism generate knowledge of the world.4 
Qutb and Hanafi both ran afoul of the Egyptian government. Qutb was hanged in 
1966 by the regime for allegedly advocating its forcible overthrow. Hanafi was ex- 
iled briefly between 1979 and 1982. After earning his B.A. degree from Cairo Uni- 
versity in 1956, Hanafi spent the next decade in France, getting a doctorate from the 
Sorbonne in 1966. Clearly influenced by Western thought, he nonetheless sees it in 
crisis because of its arrant secularism. Qutb, too, was strongly influenced by Western 
culture, especially its literature, in the 1920s and 1930s.5 However, he later recanted 
all his pre-1948 writings and finds nothing redeeming in Western culture (although 
he accepts its science and technology). 
Basically a scripturalist, meaning that he believed that meanings are inherent in sa- 
cred texts, Qutb nevertheless occasionally adopted positions that suggested the need 
for independent reasoning (ijtihad) and recourse to "secondary principles," such as 
"public interest" (maslaha mursala),6 a doctrine invented by jurists in later years to 
provide guidance when the sacred texts themselves were silent. Mostly, though, Qutb 
held that the sacred texts were self-evident, that they are a priori truths that simply 
need to be invoked and implemented to solve the problems of the Muslims. 
Hanafi is a left-wing phenomenologist and has served as chair of the Department 
of Philosophy at Cairo University. He uses the sacred texts and the numerous com- 
mentators upon them in the spirit of radical reconstruction of religious thought- 
rather like Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938). A former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
a connection he shares with Qutb, Hanafi remains sympathetic to the emotions ex- 
pressed by its radical offshoots. 
Qutb has had a significant impact on Arab culture and politics, especially among 
the youth. Inter alia, his writings introduced to Arabs the thinking of the Pakistani 
thinker Abu al-A'la Mawdudi (d. 1979), especially his stress upon "divine govern- 
ment" (usually wrongly translated into Arabic as hakimiyyat Allah),' and the inim- 
ical effects of an "anti-Islamic" (jahill) ethos in Islamic societies. 
Hanafi is practically the only member remaining of the "Islamic left" (a neologism 
he coined), as many of his colleagues "sold out" to the Brotherhood in the 1980s and 
1990s. Hanafi's break with the Brotherhood probably stemmed from his interest in 
using philosophy and phenomenology to develop a radical critique of tradition in 
ways that, to its members, probably smacked of sacrilegious tampering. Moreover, 
Hanafi's writings exude a sufi hermeneutic that naturally alienates most ulama and 
the Brotherhood. His eclecticism-phenomenology, rationalism, social democracy, 
critical theory, and sufism-partly accounts for the diffuseness of his writing. 
Hanafi blamed Anwar Sadat for abandoning former Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser's policies. His enthusiastic support for the Iranian Revolution, anath- 
ema to Sadat, led to his exile and a brief stint of teaching in Morocco and the Gulf 
states in the early 1980s. Though he criticized the immaturity of Sadat's killers, his 
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support for their motives and feelings has alienated some intellectuals. He is primar- 
ily known for his massive, ongoing project, The Heritage and Renewal, the first in- 
stallment of which is the five-volume work From Belief to Revolution. He has not 
generated any popular base of support, and his impact remains confined to the aca- 
demic level. 
Apart from concern with Islamic tradition and membership in the Muslim Broth- 
erhood, Hanafi and Qutb have in common careers in education-Qutb in primary and 
secondary education and in educational administration, and Hanafi in higher edu- 
cation. Both also studied in the West. Both have been bitterly critical of Western 
imperialism, and the United States in particular. Qutb, however, was generally anti- 
Western, whereas Hanafi is a cosmopolitan and proud of his European ties. Both 
have championed the Arab masses and counted on their ability to understand their 
oppression and to act. Both have believed in the need to inculcate consciousness in 
the masses by a tightly knit group of adepts, although they disagree on the means to 
accomplish it. Hanafi adopts seemingly Leninist positions, whereas Qutb advocated 
a more traditional response: emigration to form a pious nucleus of believers that 
would grow through missionizing. Both have underpinned arguments with concepts 
whose origins are Western. Hanafi does this without apology, whereas in Qutb's case, 
the pattern is unacknowledged but discernible nevertheless.8 
QUTB'S DISCOURSE 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s,9 Qutb was engrossed in the social problems of the 
Arabs. A few short years later, however, he was to focus on more basic concerns. 
This does not mean that he was in a secular phase which he then abandoned.10 On 
the contrary, in this earlier phase he believed that Egyptians (Arabs, Muslims) lived 
in certifiably Muslim societies, and that those societies had problems that needed to 
be addressed and solved. His works in this period abound with such terms as con- 
sultation (shura), social justice (al-'adala al-ijtimaciyya), mutual responsibility (al- 
takaful al-ijtimc'i), and equality (al-musawat). Qutb ardently identified with the 
poor and urged Arab regimes to improve their lives. This they could achieve, pro- 
vided that they rejected Western and Soviet models for Islam and implemented Is- 
lamic ordinances." These writings unremittingly reject Western cultural and social 
ideas and practices, and they occasionally cite disillusioned Western writers, includ- 
ing George Bernard Shaw and Julian Huxley. Although he resided for a couple of 
years in the West, Qutb did not command its languages and so relied on translations, 
including those by the Indian Muslim Abu al-Hasan Nadvi. 
By contrast, Qutb's later writings are more "foundational." His concern was to warn 
against living in a state of unwitting or willful ignorance of Allah's commands 
(jahiliyya). It was a short step for his followers to pronounce unbelief (al-takfir)'2 
upon people regarded to be behaving in such a manner. Qutb's vocabulary also in- 
cluded the Islamic method or system (al-manhaj al-Islami); organic, dynamic fu- 
sion (al-tajammu' al-haraki al-'udwl); the sovereignty of Allah (hdkimiyyat Allah); 
godly existence (al-kaynuna al-rabbaniyya); worship of and servitude to Allah (al- 
Cubuidiyya); exertion for the sake of Islam (jihad). In these later writings (late 1950s 
to mid-1960s) he reminds Muslims of their relationship to Allah. Qutb has become 
certain that most people claiming to be Muslims are not really Muslims. Despite his 
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rejection of non-Islamic models, Qutb in fact borrowed from Western ideas in seeking 
to advance his scripturalist positions-especially in regard to matters of social justice. 
This is not to suggest that Muslims had not developed a concept of justice. Indeed, 
justice (cadl) is a major concept in the Islamic heritage. However, classical texts and 
commentaries restricted the concept within a narrow compass until the 1940s, when it 
suddenly made its appearance in the form of social justice. 
It is also ironic that, despite his repudiation of Islamic philosophy, Qutb's own 
thought is suffused with organicism, one of the dominant attributes of that philoso- 
phy-which was strongly influenced by Greek organic notions.'3 His works repeatedly 
refer to Islam as movement (haraka), vitality (hayawiyya), evolution (tatawwur), and 
growth (namda'). Attacking philosophers who seek secular knowledge, Qutb states: 
"We seek the movement (al-haraka) behind knowledge."'4 He writes of an Islamic 
method (manhaj islaml) that is distinctive for its dynamism, rhythm, and touch. The 
metaphor of growth (physis) that is so central to Greek thought is also basic to Qutb's 
view of Islam, whose outlook (tasawwur) posits harmonious interaction between na- 
ture and man. Islam, for Qutb, is a system that consists of an "organic and dynamic 
fusion" (tajammuc haraki Cudwj).l5 This seemingly means an aggregation of commit- 
ted Muslims who unite their ideas and actions to worship God. The whole (tajammuc) 
is greater than the sum of its parts, just as a human life is greater than the sum of the 
body's physical structure and its mental passageways. The following passage is 
instructive: 
Movement is one of the laws of this universe . . . and it is the same for the law of human 
existence.... The human being's desire for movement o change and evolve reality is a ... 
fixed truth. It stems from the general nature of things, as embodied in the movement of pri- 
mal cosmic matter . . . and second from the nature of this human being. It is a requirement 
of his duty in the vice-gerancy on earth.... [Islam is based on] freedom of natural growth 
in thoughts and feelings.... Life and existence are not stagnant but always moving, always 
changing, always evolving, constantly being formed.'6 
Qutb approvingly cites Leopold Weiss (Muhammad Asad), a recent convert to Is- 
lam, who wrote, "History tells us that all human cultures and civilizations are or- 
ganic bodies resembling living creatures that pass through all the organic stages of 
life."7 However, maintaining the eternity of Islam, Qutb quickly adds: "we could 
never say that, like other civilizations, [Islam] is subject to the passage of time and 
limited by the organic laws of life."'8 
To summarize, then, Qutb reifies Islam, endowing it with beliefs and actions that 
are aggregated in an organic dynamic fusion. Islam grows and exhibits life processes. 
Islam is, then, an independent, functioning entity (as opposed to a collectivity of in- 
dividual Muslims who decide to act in the world). Though an actor, Islam is not sub- 
ject to temporal processes, including entropy. Presumably it retains its vitality because 
of the mechanisms of renewal that are somehow immanent in it. Among these pre- 
sumably are renewal (tajdid), the application of discretion by a judge in Islamic law 
(istihsan), and rulings based on public interest (maslaha mursala). That these mech- 
anisms are actuated by actual people in actual historical times and places would 
appear to undermine his reification, although this seems not to be an issue for Qutb. 
Earlier, I maintained that Qutb is a scripturalist who believed that classic texts are 
fixed truths with fixed meanings. However, matters are not so simple. Qutb himself 
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makes a point of stressing that Islam is a realistic or practical religion. Two impor- 
tant words for him when qualifying Islam are waqi'i (actual, realistic) and Camali 
(practical). For example, he maintains that "this religion is a serious, dynamic, prac- 
tical system [manhaj Camali haraki jddd]."'9 He states that Islam "came to govern 
life in its actuality [fi wdqiciha] and to face this actuality in order to make decisions 
regarding it-whether to keep, modify, or fundamentally change it."20 Therefore, he 
declares, "Islam legislates only for conditions that actually prevail."2' Islam "is not 
a theory that deals with suppositions but is a system that deals with actuality."22 In 
order to make sure that he is understood in the matter of the dynamism of Islam, he 
declares: 
Islamic society is, thus, not a fixed historical model as to its form, size, and the kind of life 
that prevails there.... Islamic civilization can take various forms in its concrete structural 
manifestation, though the principles upon which it rests are fixed.... The forms of Islamic 
civilization that rest upon these fixed principles are influenced by the degree of economic 
and scientific progress, because these forms make use of what in fact is found in that civili- 
zation, whatever the environment.23 
What is Qutb getting at? Is he saying that the laws of Islam are eternal, but their 
method of implementation changes according to different historical periods? His 
emphasis on Islam as a practical religion seems to be suggesting so. He says that in 
the Meccan period (610-22), the Muslims were urged to believe, but "they did not 
have an actual independent life so that they could have organized themselves ac- 
cording to Allah's law."24 However, in the Medinan period (622-61), the Muslims 
were provided with the laws that they needed because, at this time, "they had an em- 
powered state" and "laws were revealed to them, and the system was established for 
them that met the actual needs of Muslim society."25 
In distinguishing between the Meccan and Medinan periods, Qutb seems to imply 
that changes in historical time bring with them changes in the way people address Is- 
lam. But at the end of the day, this is not in fact what he believes. He actually main- 
tains his scripturalist identity, because in the Meccan period, there were no laws to 
obey, just beliefs to hold. Accordingly, the way to implement the laws could not have 
changed across the two periods because it was only in the Medinan era that the 
Prophet promulgated actual laws. 
Moreover, because Qutb's late writings hold that everything that had happened af- 
ter 661 (except for the rule of 'Umar II from 717 to 720) was jdhili,26 it is the Me- 
dinan era that stands as the unique exemplar for contemporary Egypt of Islamic 
state and law. This means that one has no choice but to apply the fixed truths of the 
Medinan model per se (there being no other models of true Islam) if one is inter- 
ested in changing the Egyptian realities of the late 20th century (or any time period 
after A.D. 661, for that matter). 
Furthermore, note Qutb's unit of analysis. It is "Islam" that "has come to regulate 
the affairs of life in their actuality."27 It is "Islam" that "faces this actuality in order 
to make judgments about it with its commands."28 Thus, if one is arguing that Qutb 
insists on the historicity of the application of the law-according to which the 
method of application may vary from one era to the next-one must somehow ex- 
plain why Qutb is unwilling to accept the possibility that human beings might freely 
wish to interpret matters in non-scripturalist ways. His reification of Islam renders it 
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difficult, if not impossible, to see the role of human beings except insofar as they 
would today follow the model of Medina. 
At one point, Qutb tries to show that the forms of Islamic society may differ while 
the principles upon which they rest are immutable.29 After Islam entered Africa, the 
natives began to wear clothes and emerged from their "doltish lethargy" to engage 
in energetic work. They stopped worshiping totems and prayed only to Allah. By 
citing this example, Qutb feels he has demonstrated the historicity of the forms of Is- 
lamic society in the context of the timelessness of Islamic values, presumably because 
black African societies are structured differently, say, from Arabian societies on the 
peninsula. But this is not persuasive. First, how can Qutb give this as an example of 
Islamic society if it is inevitably jahili? Also, in what way is his reference to central 
Africa's embracing Islam a demonstration of the historicity of the forms of Islamic 
civilization? He has not shown the manner in which the legal, political, social and 
economic processes and institutions of these Africans arose and vary from the legal, 
political, social, and economic processes and institutions of another Islamic people, 
while both peoples remain faithful to the eternal and unchanging principles. Qutb 
does not demonstrate how individuals shaped these processes and institutions in his- 
torical time. Notice how he phrased it: 
Islam [sic] created civilization in central Africa among the naked people, for by its very ex- 
istence it clothed bare bodies. Thus, the people entered the civilization of clothing, embraced 
by the Islamic orientation that was applied. Also, people began to abandon their doltish leth- 
argy for energetic work to exploit the material treasures [of the world]. Additionally, they 
left the state of tribalism for the umma. They stopped worshipping specific totems and began 
worshipping Allah. What is civilization if not this? . . . As for Islam entering into another 
environment, it creates through its eternal values another form of civilization, which form 
utilizes and fosters that civilization's existing assets and possibilities.30 
Once again, it is "Islam" that "creates" or "Islam" that "enters into." True, he speaks 
of other forms of Islamic civilization, but it is Islam that creates these forms. If it is 
"Islam" that does this, and if he already has told us that nothing is Islam except the 
practice of the Prophet, the Medinan caliphate, and the rule of 'Umar II, then clearly 
he leaves us with a dilemma: the Islam of 622-61 (and 717-20) must constantly rep- 
licate itself in all environments and all historical periods if the result is to be the 
genuine article. If it does not, then the product is not Islam. Meanwhile, the role of 
human beings has been reduced to the alleged actor who is acted upon-by a dis- 
embodied Islamic "system."3' 
Recapitulating, in Qutb's view the answers to the most pressing human needs over 
the course of changing historical time are to be found within the web of Islamic 
praxis (i.e., the unity of Islam's theory and practice). This is apparently so because 
of the flexibility he believes is evinced by Islam, as manifested by what he holds to 
be its dynamic quality, as outlined earlier. In short, internal to Islam are the social- 
response mechanisms to human needs. However, in truth, Qutb gives Muslims a 
stark choice between a reification (the model of 622-61/717-20) andjahiliyya. If all 
other periods are ruled out as models for law and state, then it is hard to accept Qutb's 
claim that while the general truths of Islam are eternal, the method of implementing 
the laws and regulations of Islam differ from one historical period to another. 
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SOCIAL JUSTICE IN QUTB'S WRITINGS 
Whereas Qutb believed that he had logically anchored his concept of social justice 
in the dynamic (haraki) quality of Islam, his views of social justice probably ema- 
nated from notions of distributive justice of Western provenance. By this, I do not 
suggest that Qutb directly drew from Western writings on social justice. I argue 
rather that the social discourse of late-1940s Egypt, influenced by Fabian and other 
European currents of socialist thought, resonated with ideas of welfare, public good, 
and collective responsibility-in a word, social justice.32 He thus appropriated the 
concept of social justice from this discourse and "realized" (that is, materialized) it 
in the sacred texts because of the importance he attached to his project of showing 
that Islam is superior to any system generated in the West. Ironically, this act of ap- 
propriating and "realizing" social justice in the Qur'an and sunna is further warrant 
for identifying Qutb as a scripturalist. 
Distributive justice, with its roots in Plato and the Greeks, is embedded in the 
concept of natural law. The law of nature applies to a system of right or justice held 
to be common to all human beings. Enlightenment writers argued that natural law 
superseded the laws of religion and the state. Combining these considerations with 
notions of social contract, philosophers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau held that 
as individuals entered into such contracts, they did not cede their natural rights to a 
ruler but to society as a whole. Thus, society became the guarantor of the rights of 
its members to freedom, equality, and social justice. In all this, there is no accom- 
modation of divine law. 
In the Qur'anic tradition, according to 4:58, "Allah commands you to return trusts 
to their owners." This is usually interpreted to mean that Allah has vouchsafed to 
human beings, his vice-gerants, certain "deposits" or "trusts." These temporarily be- 
stowed trusts (amdnat) include such things as knowledge and the law of God, which 
must be returned to Allah and the Prophet (their "owners"). By contrast, natural-law 
and social-contract theorists held that it is society that is the trustee and human be- 
ings who, as the trustors, have vouchsafed their deposits (i.e., their justice, freedom, 
equality, and pursuit of happiness) to this society. Consequently, it is society that 
must render the trusts to their owners-that is, to individuals. This notion is, of 
course, completely antithetical to the Qur'anic view, which holds Allah-not his 
vice-gerants-to be the trustor. 
Accordingly, the Arabic term al-'adala al-ijtimd'iyya-"social justice"-is a 
20th-century neologism coined by Muslim writers taking cues from ideas imported 
from abroad. Islamic scripture (the Qur'an and sunna) simply did not reflect within 
its rich tradition such a thoroughly anthropocentric concept as social justice. 
In the Qur'an, the noun form 'adala-justice-does not appear. Instead, the root, 
'a-d-l, appears in the verbal perfect, imperfect, and imperative forms (Cadala/ 
yacdilu/icdil), and in the noun form ('adl). As a verb, it means to proportion, create 
in symmetry; to be just, equitable; to offer an equivalent; to swerve; to ascribe equals 
[to God]. In the noun form, it means counterpoise, equivalent; justice; equity. Thus, 
'adl in the meaning of "justice" and "equity" does appear in the scriptures but lacks 
a social dimension. In 2:282, the word qualifies a scribe writing down the terms of 
a contract in a just manner or a guardian explaining a contract in a just manner to a 
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mentally deficient individual. In 4:3, believers are admonished to act justly toward 
orphaned girls by marrying the ones who are lawful to the Muslims in order to pre- 
vent their abuse. Later (4:129), Allah warns Muslims that they will not be able to 
treat multiple wives equitably and hence should marry only one. Later yet (4:135), 
Allah admonishes Muslims not to let lust make them swerve from justice. 
At other points, Allah commands the Prophet to judge equitably among people 
(al-nas) (4:58) or to arbitrate equitably among two warring factions (49:9). In 5:8, 
Allah orders believers not to let hatred for others cause them to deviate from justice 
and warns them to be just. The term Cadl is also used to refer to "two persons of 
equity" in regard to determining appropriate compensation for killing game while 
on the pilgrimage (5:95); witnessing the signature of a will (5:106); or witnessing 
a man's divorcing his wife without violating the injunction not to do so during a 
woman's pregnancy (65:2). 
On some occasions, the justice in question refers to Allah's words, held to be per- 
fect in truth and justice (6:115) or deemed as enjoining justice (16:90). In 6:152, Al- 
lah commands people always to speak with justice. In 7:159, reference is made to 
certain followers of Moses who "show the way to the truth and deal justly in accor- 
dance with it." More generically, in 7:181, Allah says that He has "created people 
who lead [others] to truth and act justly in its light." And in 7:15, the Prophet is com- 
manded to tell the faithful that he has been ordered to act with justice (or possibly 
with "equivalence") toward them. In a final case, the word refers to the difference 
between a dumb man and a man who is "just" and follows the right path (16:76). 
Most of these references are to Allah's conduct; to discrete, individualized rela- 
tionships among individuals involving quite specific aspects of private life, or to 
very abstract notions of equity in people's general behavior. In the two cases in 
which the arena in which justice is to be exercised seems to be a public one (4:58 and 
49:9), the "social" dimension is still missing. In 4:58, the word nas (people) is an ab- 
stract term lacking notions of corporate personality and rights that inhere when one 
speaks of social justice for a group in a modern sense. Instead, Allah commands that 
those who judge must do so "in a just manner" (bi-l-adl) toward an abstract entity 
referred to as "the people." In fact, Qutb's own commentary on this verse stresses 
that the referent of al-nas in this passage is "each individual as an individual."33 If 
Qutb had social justice in mind, one would think that he would try to introduce the 
concept of a citizenry rather than refer to atomistic "individuals as individuals." As 
for 49:9-arbitrating with justice in relationship to warring factions-the justice 
that is bespoken is akin to fair-mindedness. This is not the meaning of social justice 
as it is understood in the modern sense, which is a matter of a collectivity whose 
members share interests, constitute themselves as a corporate group, and struggle to 
promote those interests in the arena of civil society.34 
In the sunna, the noun form 'adala appears only once in the eight major codices 
of Sunni hadith.35 This lone reference is in the phrase, "for these are people of stead- 
fastness and justice" (wa hd'uld' ahl al-thabt wa-al-addla).36 The characterization, 
"people of ... justice" qualifies a group of people who behave equitably in terms of 
accepted understandings of ethical behavior. It does not carry the connotations of a 
corporate unit to which accrues the legal right and standing to demand justice as a 
matter of the interest of the corporate whole. 
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In a recent study, Toby E. Huff holds that in Islamic tradition, considerations of 
justice are adumbrated by reference to the "highly particularistic . .. treating all cases 
according to the particularities of the case and the individual . .. thereby refrain[ing] 
from establishing a set of uniform and universal principles of fairness and justice." 
As Joseph Schacht puts it: "The aim of Islamic law is to provide concrete and ma- 
terial standards, not to impose formal rules on the play of contending interests."37 
The reason that it is important to stress this point about the silence of the scripture 
on the theme of social justice is that Qutb maintains that the Muslim can find every- 
thing necessary for his well-being there.38 Although Qutb occasionally refers to the 
fuqaha' of later generations to support some points that he wishes to make,39 the 
overwhelming majority of his references are to the Qur'anic and sunna texts. 
It may be maintained that justice takes on a social dimension in the writing of al- 
Ghazali (within the framework of his theory of virtue) and that, therefore, Qutb is 
drawing from the Islamic tradition after all. However, as Mohamed Ahmed Sherif 
notes, when al-Ghazali does talk about justice, his emphasis is on 
justice in respect to character traits. It is true that he speaks about the religious law and the 
need to observe it, but justice for him is important because it is the virtue of the soul which 
is a sign of individual perfection, not because it has a social function. Justice brings about 
a harmony among the faculties of the soul, preparing the individual for superior virtues. Be- 
cause of this view of justice, Ghazali does not list any virtues under justice, unlike some 
Muslim philosophers, such as Miskawayh. This brief description is all that Ghazali has to 
say about justice.... He devotes more space to other virtues and thus he shows his dis- 
agreement with the philosophic tradition in which justice, especially in its social context, 
occupies a high position.40 
It is true that justice does, indeed, take on a social dimension in the writings of Is- 
lamic philosophy. Even al-Ghazali (who might be considered the least objectionable 
of the philosophers from a Qutbian perspective) did accept in passing the Aristote- 
lian Nichomachean Ethics' concept of distributive justice-rendering this as "jus- 
tice in relation to transactions" and pointing out that "the distribution of goods in 
the city can only be just when the ruler takes into consideration the functions of the 
different classes of the city as well as the natural order of things."41 But al-Ghazali 
does not appear to have attempted systematically to integrate the Aristotelian notion 
of distributive justice into his scheme of the virtue and excellence of the individual, 
and, indeed, it remained an ad hoc component of his Weltanschauung. Moreover, as 
noted earlier, Qutb rejected the contributions of Islamic philosophy because, in his 
view, they corrupt the intent of the scripture. 
The rejoinder may be made that Islamic law permits invoking the doctrine of "sec- 
ondary principles" when strict adherence to the "primary principles" of the faith 
might cause harm to the Muslims. Two such "secondary principles" are discretion of 
the jurist (istihsdn) and public interest (maslaha mursala).42 Consequently, those 
sympathetic to Qutb's argument could hold that even if social-justice meanings are 
absent in the original canonical sources, jurists writing in later historical periods 
nonetheless have contributed to the gradual construction of precisely such a doctrine 
of social justice by invoking these secondary principles in the desire to protect the 
life's chances-hence, distributive social justice-of the Muslims. But in fact it 
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seems that it is only in the 1940s that Muslim writers take up the matter of social 
justice. 
According to Olivier Carre,43 the concept of social justice came into currency for 
the first time in Sunni Islamic discourse in 1949 in the writings of Muhammad al- 
Ghazzali (who may have been the very first writer to use the term), CAbd al-Qadir 
'Awda and Sayyid Qutb between 1949 and 1951.44 Recently, it has been argued that 
Qutb had finished the draft of his book Social Justice and Islam in 1948, although ac- 
tual publication did not follow for a year.45 Qutb was to join the Brotherhood shortly, 
while the others were already members. (Significantly, 'Awdah had been trained as a 
lawyer in France.) If earlier jurists were adding to the corpus of legal thought that 
could accommodate the idea that the natural repository for "social justice" was "Is- 
lam," it is surprising that the concept did not emerge earlier than the 1940s. 
In summary, social justice is absent from the Qur'an and sunna. Although suspect 
among the jurists who have been the architects of Islamic ordinances relating to so- 
cial relations, certain Muslim philosophers did accept Aristotelian notions of dis- 
tributive justice in portraying the ideal individual and the ideal city. These writings 
remained on the margins of legal developments until the 20th century, when reform- 
ers, following the opening provided by Muhammad 'Abduh's (d. 1905) argument 
that reason could constitute a basis for judgment in Islamic law, sought to work out 
an Islamic concept of social justice. To do so, they addressed elements of social 
democratic theory, with its roots in the Enlightenment, Locke, Hobbes, Roman law, 
and the Greeks. The seeds of the concept of social justice are already to be found in 
the writings of Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
QUTB'S TURN FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Qutb turned from the social-justice themes in his later work, perhaps because the 
Egyptian government-which had launched a devastating campaign against the 
Muslim Brotherhood-had coopted the theme of social justice for its own ideology 
of "democratic cooperative socialism." Increasingly, Qutb emphasized Allah's sov- 
ereignty (hakimiyyat Allah). As earlier noted, he was influenced in this by Mawdudi, 
who, however, never used the term but instead spoke of "divine government." The 
word hakimiyya does not appear in the Qur'an in this form. However, in two key 
verses, judgment (hukm) is ascribed to Allah alone (12:40 and 12:67: "inna al-hukm 
illa li-Allah"). Qutb's interpretation of these verses is that the word hukm should be 
translated not as judgment but as rule.46 Thus, when he interprets the crucial verses 
in 5:44, 5:45, and 5:47, he renders the imperfect verbal form, yahkum, as rules, not 
judges. These verses have traditionally been interpreted as follows: "He who does 
not judge according to Allah's revelation is an unbeliever [5:44]/oppressor [5:45]/ 
ungodly [5:47]." 
Hasan Hudhaybi, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood between 1951 
and 1973, termed Qutb's interpretation of hukm and yahkum as sovereignty and rule 
as a heretical innovation (bid'a),47 insisting that the traditional rendering of "judg- 
ing" and "judgment" was the correct one. Despite this, Qutb's interpretation has in- 
troduced a new element into the discussion: 
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Islam is servitude to Allah alone and assigning divine characteristics to Him, the foremost 
of which is sovereignty (al-hakimiyya).... "And he who does not rule according to what 
Allah has revealed is an unbeliever." What we have said about Islam is not a heretical inno- 
vation that we have thought up.48 
Accordingly, Qutb adopted a radically uncompromising stand on these verses, on 
the basis of which one might conclude that any Muslim who did not accept that sov- 
ereignty and rule were Allah's alone was an unbeliever. This in itself is not remark- 
able, but the idea that a particular individual or group could claim the right to decide 
whether or not others accepted Allah's sovereignty is rejected by many.49 
These considerations led Qutb finally to call for the establishment of a counterso- 
ciety of pious Muslims, which would be formed through their figurative and, if nec- 
essary, literal "emigration" from the surrounding godless (jdhili) society. Qutb wished 
to create a sufficiently aware and committed core of adherents to "true" Islam. He 
hoped this would occur peacefully, but a coercive response by jahili rulers and their 
supporters might make this impossible.50 
HASAN HANAFI'S PROJECT 
As noted, Hasan Hanafi had also been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. His 
studies at the Sorbonne, where he obtained the doctorate in 1966, exposed him to ar- 
guments of the left (socialism and Marxism), as well as to various scholarly ap- 
proaches to knowledge, including phenomenology, rationalism, and critical theory. 
Phenomenologists believe that knowledge comes from the apprehension of phe- 
nomena by direct investigation and through a formal description of their structure, 
without recourse to theoretically based causal explanations. But causality is a 
significant concern in the burhan tradition, a category into which Jabiri places 
Hanafi, as was earlier indicated. 
Hanafi intended his journal, The Islamic Left (al-Yasar al-lsldmi), to be a succes- 
sor to the 19th-century al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa, founded by Muhammad 'Abduh and 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani as a vehicle for the Islamic critique of Western civilization. 
Sadat's September 1981 crackdown on domestic opposition groups meant that he 
could publish only one issue of this journal. 
Hanafi believes that Qutb would have become a member of the "Islamic Left" had 
he lived.5' He is sympathetic to much in Qutb's perspective, both praising him52 and 
accepting many of Qutb's premises, including, for example, the belief that Islam was 
the first socialist religion.53 Hanafi maintains that Qutb's apparent extremism stemmed 
directly from his torture. However, as Abu Zayd notes, this would not explain why 
others such as Mawdudi, who had never suffered torture, adopted similar positions. 
Hanafi, however, takes significantly different positions from Qutb, especially in re- 
gard to the importance of philosophy and rationalism in human history and society. 
Whereas Hanafi speaks of the "enlightened thinker" and "enlightened reason," Qutb 
insists on "servitude" (CubCudiyya) and warns against the danger of secularism that 
lurks insidiously in the interstices of rationalist discourse.54 Hanafi could not disagree 
more. In a forceful passage, Hanafi wonders: 
388 Shahrough Akhavi 
There is no doubt that if we wanted to get into a bidding competition in regard to belief and 
defending Allah, razing [the edifice of] reason and cancelling out the human being, we would 
say that Allah rules over the mind and that the mind is the object that is governed; that Allah 
is the creator of it, the possessor of all things, the ruler of all things. But where can the danger 
be? What is the situation in which we find ourselves? Is Allah in danger? Or is reason? Do 
we defend Allah's hadkimiyya or the hdkimiyya of reason? Are we defenders of Allah or are 
we human beings defending human rights? It may be that the human being, in the presence of 
this bidding competition, will keep silent in fear of the coercion of the masses, the weight of 
history, and the attack of the rulers. However, defending the rule of reason is the task of our 
generation, defending the rights of the people [al-nds] and employing their minds.55 
Hence, not surprisingly Hanafi disagrees with Qutb's implicit requirement that 
"true" Muslims pronounce unbelief (takfir) upon "false" believers. One of Hanafi's 
major goals is to transcend mutual recriminations in regard to pronouncing unbelief 
and apostasy upon people.56 Hanafi's own purpose is the reconstruction of Islamic 
civilization, a task he assigns to himself. In a remarkable comparison, his publisher 
maintains that Hanafi's project is comparable to Ibn Khaldun's examination of the 
rise and fall of civilizations for the purpose of regenerating Islam.57 One finds a cer- 
tain instrumentalism in Hanafi insofar as his treatment of the turath is concerned. 
Seemingly, he wants to fashion the turdth into an ideology. As such, this turdth be- 
comes a repository from which to draw ideas and deploy them as weapons to stake 
out interests in historical time and place.58 
Hanafi wants to reconstitute the tradition of the ancestors (al-salaf) so that the 
human being and history are placed at the center of concern. "The Science of the 
Principles of Religion" (Ilm Usil al-Din), with which all classical Islamic learning 
starts, ends, in Hanafi's scheme, with "The Human Being and History" (al-Insdn wa 
al-Ta'rikh). It would appear that this bifurcation is based on ideal types, with the 
former representing the experience of Muslims at the formative stage of their reli- 
gion, and the latter reflecting the contemporary good Muslim liberated from the 
negative accumulations of deadly imitation. Hanafi calls "The Science of the Prin- 
ciples of Religion" (Ilm Usil al-Din) "general history" (al-Ta9rikh al-CAmm); by 
contrast, he calls "The Human Being and History" (al-Insdn wa al-Ta9rikh) "par- 
ticular history" (al-TaDrikh al-Mutacayyan). Here is how he distinguishes between 
general and particular history: 
After general history, which is manifested in Prophecy and the Day of Judgment-that is, 
in the past of human-kind and in its future-appears special or particular history, which is 
manifested first of all in theory and action. . . Whereas general history was the creation of 
Allah, since it is He Who sends the prophets and calls the people to Him on the Day of 
Judgment, particular history is the creation of the human being. For theory and action are 
individual, human categories; similarly, rule and state are discretionary human social sys- 
tems. General history is materialized only in particular history. . . . [T]he Divine Project as 
it was completed in the Revelation as Divine Knowledge can only be materialized through 
the theory and practice of the human being and the rule and system of the community. It is 
in particular history that the Science of the Principles of Religion is concluded, the Revela- 
tion of the Divine Will is achieved, beliefs are established, and order is perfected.59 
Abu Zayd provides a chart (Table 1) purporting to show Hanafi's reconstruction of 
Islam, one that features the juxtaposition of classical concepts with their anthropo- 
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TABLE 1 Hanafi's reconstruction of Islam 
The Human Being in History 
(The Science of the Principles of Religion) 
The Human Being History 
(Theology) (Oral Traditions) 
The Ideal Human Being The Actual Human Being 
(Monotheism) (Justice) 
l I 
Pure Consciousness Actual Consciousness Freedom Reason 
(Essence) (Attributes) (The Creation Acts) (Rebuke & Approbation) 
General History Actual History 
(Prophecy, Day of Judgment) (Attributes, Ordinances, Imamate) 
Development of Revelation The Future Theory & Practice Rule & Revolution 
(Prophecy) (Day of Judgment) Attributes & Ordinances Imamate 
Science of the Principles of Religion, cilm usul al-din; Theology, al-ilahiyyat; Oral Traditions, al- 
samciyydt; Monotheism, al-tawhid; Justice, al-'adl; Essence, al-dhdt; Attributes, al-sifat; The Creation 
& Acts, al-khalq wa al-afcdl; Approbation & Rebuke, al-tahsin wa al-taqblh; Prophecy & Day of 
Judgment, al-nubuwwa wa al-mi'dd; Ordinances & Imamate, al-ahkdm wa al-imdma. 
centric and historicized counterparts. In the chart, the classical concepts are put in 
parentheses, and their anthropocentric and historicized analogues are presented 
above those concepts.60 
In Hanafi's view, the original subjects of 'llm Usul al-Din include oral traditions 
(al-samciyyiit); the religious sciences (al-ildhiyydt); the oneness of God (tawhid); the 
essence, attributes, and names of God (al-dhat. al-sifdt. al-asmd'); the contingency 
of human action (iktisab); prophecy (nubuwwa); the day of judgment (mftidd); the or- 
dinances of religion (ahkam); and the imamate (imama). Through human reconstruc- 
tion-that is, as a result of human beings living their lives in actual historical time- 
these classic concepts become transformed into spatial and temporal qualities: the 
ideal and the actual human being, pure consciousness, particular consciousness, free- 
dom, reason, general history, particular history, theory, practice, rule, and revolution. 
The reconstructed forms, of course, are produced not only through human agency but 
also by human beings who are fully conscious of what they are doing. Without this 
transformation of the classical concepts of Islam, which can be effected only by 
people actively mediating them through their concrete historical experiences and 
struggles, Islam will remain simply an idealization that will never be actualized in 
human communities. 
Put in the context of Qutb's thought, this perspective is striking. Qutb wanted 
somehow to make real for every late-20th-century Muslim Hanafi's "ideal type" of 
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general history. In contrast, one might say that Hanafi's "unit of analysis" is the in- 
dividual human being living in actual historical time. He would admonish that Qutb's 
project, despite references to Islam as a practical religion, abstracts the human being 
from the world in which he lives in the effort to make that individual the pious fac- 
totum of divine will. 
Generally speaking, Hanafi is impatient with the failure of modern Islamic intel- 
lectual and social movements to unite their calls for action with a sound analysis and 
theoretical foundation. It is no good to call for action to restore the excellence of Is- 
lamic society if one does not undertake a critique of Islam itself. Hanafi and Qutb 
clearly part company on this important issue. Qutb assumes as given and unprob- 
lematical a number of the characteristics that Hanafi wants critically to analyze. 
Here is how Hanafi puts it: 
Modern [Islamic] reform movements have substituted action for theory, persisting in calling 
for [action] for more than one and a half centuries.... Is it possible to call for action with- 
out a theory of action? Is it possible to change without a theory of change? . . . Thus, reform 
[efforts] have remained [at the level of] mere preaching, giving guidance, goading the 
people to action. But the people do not act on the basis of preaching but rather by ... chang- 
ing their conception of the world. Therefore a return to the establishment of knowledge and 
transforming unity into theory are the path to radical reform. The transition from reform to 
revolution is first of all firmly rooted in the consciousness of the masses, which provides 
them with a revolutionary conception of the world before the revolution occurs in fact. The 
theory of knowledge is the necessary ideological edifice for the revolution of the masses.61 
Hanafi maintains that early Muslims knew the importance of theory as the basis 
of all action.62 These adepts worked through the complex of ideas that was raised be- 
fore them by the Prophet-not in some abstracted manner, divorced from the his- 
torical conditions in which they lived, but, on the contrary, by reference to these 
conditions. In this manner, early Muslims did not consider Allah as a mental construct 
to be confirmed or disconfirmed. In a remarkable passage, Hanafi says that for them, 
Allah is a project of humanity [mashri' al-insdniyya] the realization of which this humanity 
has tried to effect from its inception until now. Allah is the progress of history in the creation 
of which human beings have a share. Allah is not a subject whose existence can be rationally 
proved but rather is history which progresses, reality which moves, and masses who make 
revolution.63 
Qutb would surely reject this assessment of Allah as somehow subsumed in human 
history. He would hold that it is a classic case of jahill thinking, the more inimical 
to the Muslims' interests because it is advanced by one whom he would regard as a 
nominal believer. 
But for Hanafi, any other interpretation is a prescription for continued stagnation. 
Unfortunately, he maintains, this patent historicity of Islam and the role of the Mus- 
lims eventually became undone in favor of a perspective that abstracted the faith and 
its believers from the world of reality into some hypostatization. How did things reach 
this pass? Why is it that, as Hanafi sees it, Muslims are unable to understand their 
situation in ways that will enable them to generate creative solutions to their present 
problems? The short answer is the "tyranny" of Ash'arite ontology and epistemology, 
which, despite its Mu'tazilite contenders, sealed its victory through the efforts of the 
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great Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1 11 1).64 Ashcari authoritarian control over the sharica 
in the service of the ruling classes can be ended only by a constructive critique of the 
entire "heritage." Otherwise, spontaneity by itself, as the left has long argued, can 
achieve only so much. 
For Hanafi, contemporary Arab society is divided into two parts, one represented 
by the movement known as the salafiyya, the other by secularism. He sees his con- 
tribution to overcoming their sterile confrontation as freeing the salafis from their 
rigid orientation toward the past (ittiba'), and as reforming the reprehensible inno- 
vations (bidca) of the secularists.65 
Hanafi believes that the "heritage" is the basis of contemporary awareness in so- 
ciety and calls it the "psychological storehouse" of the masses. In focusing on the 
elements of the "heritage" that are in need of "renewal" (tajdid) Hanafi is motivated 
by the needs of the present. For Hanafi, the "heritage" by itself has no inherent 
value. Its worth is measured by being the source for generating a scientific theory of 
action that can be put to use for the individual's benefit. This seems somewhat like 
secularism, but secularism interests itself in human progress without regard to reli- 
gious knowledge and experience, a disregard that Hanafi, of course, rejects. Here is 
how he puts it: 
Our faith [is] in the heritage and its renewal [al-turath wa al-tajdid] and the possibility of 
solving the crisis of the [present] age . . . and the possibility of reconstructing the heritage 
to give the [present] age a new push forward. The heritage ... is a psychological storehouse 
for the masses and the theoretical foundation for the structure of reality.66 
Hanafi's purpose is to link contemporary values and concepts with those of the 
heritage. But he does not really analyze the historical evolution and crystallization 
of those values and concepts in the past or the present age. How have people come 
to absorb particular values in their consciousness in historical time, past or present? 
He accepts it as a given that certain values came to be held in earlier years. Seeing 
similar values in the present age, he concludes that the latter emanate from the 
former. He declares that his research "attempts to unite 'the heritage and the re- 
newal"' and holds that "the historical roots of the crises of the [present] age [are] in 
the old heritage, reading the past in the present and seeing the present in the past."67 
Every era, he notes, shapes its culture and its conceptions. The conceptions of the 
ancestors (al-salaf) were purely historical ones, expressing the realities of their time 
and level of culture. The same process is at work in the contemporary period. But 
the two processes do not operate in mutual isolation. The relationship between them 
is a dialectical one of nonconnection and connection. Hanafi says that we necessar- 
ily start from our own time period and look back on our past. In doing that, we find 
in our past the reasons for our current problems, for the decline and breakdowns that 
we are currently witnessing. "It is as though we choose from the old only what we 
want."68 
Thus, Hanafi seems to be proposing a rather pragmatic course: select from the heri- 
tage those elements that seem to make sense and are also relevant for current prob- 
lems. If we do this, then we can avoid trying to achieve the impossible, returning to 
a golden age in wholesale fashion. What is to ensure that Hanafi's process of selection 
does not become unmanageable? He presumably would maintain that one would be 
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guided by the categories of 'Ilm Usul al-Din, and not by phenomena divorced from 
that theological foundation. Those categories, as noted earlier, include oral traditions; 
the religious sciences; the oneness of Allah; the essence, attributes, and names of Al- 
lah; the religious ordinances; the contingency of human action; prophecy; day of 
judgment; and the imamate. But that still leaves the scope for choice rather wide. 
Contemporary problems in Islamic societies include illiteracy, hunger, poverty, over- 
crowding, maldistribution of wealth, and authoritarian rule. What aspects of kalam 
can one draw upon to confront and begin to solve some of these problems? Moreover, 
who is to do the selecting? 
Yet the process is not totally ungoverned, Hanafi maintains. In his view, the 
movement from the present to the past, which he characterizes as an "ascending 
movement," is mediated by what he calls the "psychological storehouse" of the 
masses. By this, he seems to mean that the ordinary Muslim has a certain stock of 
appreciation and understanding of the heritage as he or she looks back on the past 
for guidelines for current behavior. On the other side of this is the movement from 
the past to the present, which he characterizes as a "descending movement," and it 
is mediated by what he terms "consciousness" (shu'ur). 
To summarize this, then, as the Muslim moves back in time, he or she draws on 
his or her "psychological storehouse" of values and symbols, based on his or her un- 
derstanding of that heritage. Then, armed with the appropriate elements of the old 
kalam, he or she moves forward in time toward the present again. This time, though, 
instead of drawing upon his or her psychological storehouse, he or she applies his or 
her perceptions and awareness of current-day problems in terms of the model solu- 
tions that the elements of the heritage with which he or she is armed can provide. It 
is this supposedly dynamic process-seeing the relevance of the past for the present 
and projecting the problems of the present into the past-that will allow Muslims 
finally to address and solve their most pressing concerns. 
Hanafi boldly asserts that the tragedy of the Muslims lies in a mechanical follow- 
ing of the models of the past. His solution is the "Islamic left," whose discourse, he 
believes, derives from human reality and history, not some disembodied, abstracted 
sacrality (qaddsa) existing outside of history. According to Hanafi's line of argument, 
the heritage is not a cluster of fixed theoretical truths. Truths become such only in 
specific times and places. The "heritage" is thus the sum of the validations (tahaqqu- 
qdt) of these theoretical truths in specific historical times and places, validations 
effected by the behavior of individuals. This being so, then the old truths are always 
subject to reevaluation at later historical times and places. Here, he feels, is Islam's 
mechanism for genuine change and renewal. Too many people say "Let us return to 
the past." Hanafi avers, "Let us use the past to understand the present but abandon 
those aspects of the past that are not relevant, replacing them with truths whose foun- 
dations may be in the past but which otherwise are put in the service of present 
needs." 
If Qutb says "let us return to the pristine Islam," Hanafi's rejoinder is "the renewal 
of Islam is the solution." Hanafi criticizes scripturalists who believe that the truth is 
in the texts. He maintains that meanings are not inherent in texts but are attributed 
to them by actual human beings.69 Yet human beings can renew Islam only in con- 
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crete interaction with their own historical time, and Hanafi would appear to need to 
show how this interaction takes place and with what results. 
For example, suppose Hanafi tells us that more democracy, as embodied in the 
concept of "consultation" (shurd), is needed in the present to solve some of the 
problems of society. He tells us this because, in his opinion, in the early years of Is- 
lam one could find the roots of democracy in the shiurd idea. Yet he avoids showing 
how the roots of democracy actually were developed in those early years through a 
close historical analysis of groups, movements, and ideas. Did shiiur indeed evolve 
from a struggle of people in specific circumstances, or is shurd something that is 
counseled by Allah and the Prophet for the purpose of a fuller understanding of Al- 
lah's laws? If the latter, then it does not have much to do with democracy. If the 
former, then it is necessary for Hanafi to provide the specifics of the historical strug- 
gles that led to the understanding of shuird in more than a purely divine, revelational 
context. One cannot simply look at texts (the Qur'an and sunna) in that early period 
from a contemporary perspective and find "democracy" in the texts. For that is tan- 
tamount to abandoning the historicity of texts. 
Similarly, it could be that the value of equity-for example-pertained to ethical 
injunctions to be upright in relations with Allah, one's family members, and neigh- 
bors by not dissimulating to them. According to this view, too much wealth in the 
hands of one person could greatly complicate one's chances of being upright in re- 
lations with one's God, family members, and close neighbors. Yet stated as such, 
this has nothing to do with equity at the community level. What Hanafi wants to do 
is discover in the heritage the value of equity and use it to solve the problem of per- 
vasive poverty in Egypt today. But to do this, he would have to show that the value 
of equity was used in this way by the early Muslims. To do that, in turn, Hanafi 
needs to show us how people in the early period struggled with one another at given 
historical junctures to vindicate the idea that equity in the early period conveyed the 
sense of obligations by putative citizens of the community to arrogate to that com- 
munity as a social unit the authority and legitimacy to redistribute wealth in defense 
of its interests as a corporate whole against contending and competing interests. 
Hanafi cannot simply assume that this orientation to equity inhered in early times 
and so can be culled from the past and applied in the current period. 
To be sure, Hanafi says that his method avoids these problems and takes into ac- 
count that those early texts came to be written in historical time and place. This im- 
plies that comprehending them requires an understanding of the forces that went 
into their production. However, he does not seem to provide a historically grounded 
analysis of this sort. What is missing is an explanation of people's behavior and 
ideas in concrete historical junctures and in interaction with social, economic, and 
political groups, movements, and institutions. Hence, he may ironically be said to 
have committed the same error of ahistoricity of which he accuses the scripturalists. 
Hanafi's dialectic of change is abstract and diffuse. The same is not true of his out- 
line of action on behalf of that change. It is true that he has a rather utopian objective 
for the "Islamic Left"-to awaken the Muslims and achieve a revolution through a 
scholarly critique of the heritage.70 But when contemplating the actual implementa- 
tion of a revolution, he raises aloft the familiar banner of the left. Borrowing a page 
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from Marx's Theses on Feuerbach, he writes that Islamic reformers have basically 
tried merely to understand the world, whereas it is now important to change it.7' How- 
ever, in order to effect such a change, one cannot rely only on ideas. Ultimately adopt- 
ing a Leninist position, he declares that it is important to establish a revolutionary 
party organization for mass mobilization. Once a leadership is established for this or- 
ganization, it will engage in raising the consciousness of the people. This eventually 
will be followed by armed struggle for full liberation from colonialism, feudalism, 
and other evils. Again in rather utopian manner, he insists that the party will truly 
represent the masses, not a particular class or group. In colorful terminology, Hanafi 
maintains that this party is the "caliph of Allah's chosen people."72 
Qutb's view of the dynamic of the revolution is somewhat similar. He, too, speaks 
of a revolutionary "leadership" (qiyada),73 which has distinct leftist connotations. 
However, Qutb stops short of advocating a political party, contenting himself with 
the notion of emigration and establishing a countersociety on the periphery of ex- 
isting jdhili society. Once sufficient numbers have come over, the process of total 
transformation to Islamic society will occur, peacefully if the state does not react 
with coercion-although Qutb was virtually certain that the state would use force- 
otherwise through violence. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi represent two important currents of contemporary 
social thought in Egypt. Many of their concerns are similar, including a profound at- 
tachment to and concern with the turath of Egyptians, Arabs, and Muslims. While 
Qutb may be termed essentially a scripturalist, believing that sacred texts convey in- 
herent meanings in an ahistorical fashion, Hanafi maintains that the meaning of texts 
depends on their interpreters and hence on the consensus of each generation. 
Qutb rejected rationalism and philosophy more generally because, in his view, it 
departed from the religious attitude and from religious commitment. Hanafi cham- 
pioned the application of reason as the only way for Muslims today to come to grips 
with their most pressing problems. Qutb reified Islam and attributed to it qualities of 
vitalism, growth, and power. Hanafi sees things differently, believing it more con- 
structive to take not "Islam" as his unit of analysis but Muslims living in concrete 
historical periods. 
Yet Hanafi's method of seeing the past in the present and projecting from the 
present into the past seems to short-circuit historically grounded analysis after all. 
He concludes that Muslims can choose from their heritage what suits them in solv- 
ing the problems of today. But it is not clear that in doing so they indeed will be 
choosing aspects of the heritage that resonate with the actual requirements of Mus- 
lims living in the modern period, because he does not really provide us with an 
analysis of how values of the past came to acquire specific meanings, in actual his- 
torical time and place, for the people of that time. Let us recall that Hanafi's whole 
project rests on demonstrating the relevance of historical context for the significance 
of values. If he does not demonstrate this for the past, whence these values derive, 
how can he be confident about their applicability for modern historical contexts? 
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Qutb's discourse does not permit the selective choosing from aspects of a putative 
heritage. He would insist that Islam must be taken or rejected in its entirety. For him, 
of course, there can be no choice between these two alternatives. The very idea of 
social engineering of the sort implied in Hanafi's scheme is anathema to Qutb. Yet 
Qutb is just as affirmative and positive in his outlook as Hanafi is that Muslims have 
the model solutions to their problems near at hand. Both view the future with opti- 
mism. It is just that Qutb believed that Islam, which he reified, is indivisible. 
Qutb, at least in the early 1950s, emphasized themes of social justice. That he was 
borrowing a concept that emerged in a Western context is clear enough, but he 
would of course deny that and stress that social justice is rooted in the enormously 
rich legacy of Muslim writings on the concept of Cadl. There is nothing wrong with 
making social justice one of the pillars of one's analysis. But Qutb's insistence that 
the concept inheres full-blown in Islamic scripture is not tenable. Moreover, analy- 
sis of this issue shows that discourses as apparently different as those of Muslims 
and non-Muslims penetrate one another in subtle and important ways.74 
For Hanafi, it is important, in vindicating "Islamic" ends, to borrow as much from 
the heritage of the past as is suitable but then to supplement this with concepts and 
ideas from outside that heritage. Hanafi feels no constraints about analyzing his so- 
ciety through philosophical lenses that are shaped by the major intellectual move- 
ments of the 19th and 20th centuries, beyond the boundaries of the umma. 
As for practical results, both take a revolutionary position. For Qutb, the model 
solutions to the problems confronting the Muslims today revolve around a rejection 
of the society in which they find themselves, a figurative and even literal migration 
from such a society, and the construction of the bases for a countersociety of piety 
and social action. For his part, Hanafi believes that his radical and recondite recon- 
struction of the heritage will be understood by the masses, and when that happens, 
they will be ready for mobilization. Bringing this to pass, however, will require a 
nucleus of dedicated leaders, whose task will be to inculcate the appropriate theo- 
retical perspective and then lead the masses into action. Although both projects 
strike one as utopian, it may be premature to voice such a verdict, particularly-as 
both writers so frequently have declared-in light of the failure of liberal, corporat- 
ist, socialist, and Marxist models over the last century. 
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ity in the name of God, which is what Europe experienced in the form of theocracy. There is nothing of 
this in Islam. No one can speak in Allah's name except His Prophet. There are specific texts, and they 
are what determine what Allah has legislated. The statement that religion is for the sake of reality is 
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